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In “Federalist 47,” James Madison defines tyranny as “the accumulation of all powers
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed or elected.” In order to prevent tyranny, Madison argues in
“Federalist 51” that it is first necessary to separate powers among the three branches of
government and between the state and national governments. While this separation is a necessary
protection against tyranny, it is not sufficient. In addition, second, it is also necessary to conform
“the interior structure of the government, as that its constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places” (Federalist 51). This
happens when each department (House, Senate, Presidency, and Supreme Court) has “a will of
its own; and consequently, should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as
little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others” (Federalist 51). With
both of these institutional protections in place, Madison famously identifies political ambition as
the motivation that drives the system of checks and balances, protects liberty, and allows
government to pursue its end—justice. Madison writes, “Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition” (Federalist 51). Ambition, according to Madison, is the cornerstone of America’s
constitutional system rather than moral and religious motives which “lose their efficacy in
proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes
needful” (Federalist 10).
Despite the centrality of political ambition to American political thought, scholars have
paid little attention to this topic. To the extent that political theorists do, they generally follow the
lead of their empirical colleagues and assume that political ambition equals the desire for
reelection. The primacy of reelection is well established in the political behavior literature and is
identified as the primary motive for members of Congress (Mayhew 2004, Fenno 2002) and the

President (Canes-Wrone 2010). Political theorists who pay attention to political ambition tend to
locate it within the larger political theory of a particular thinker. Michael J. Rosano (2003), for
example, focuses on Alexander Hamilton’s conception of human nature and identifies the
ambition for nobility as one of many different and potentially conflicting aspects of Hamilton’s
account of human nature. These other aspects include love of liberty, Christian philanthropy,
liberalism, and power. Rosano’s focus, however, prevents him from considering the relationship
between Hamilton’s conception of human nature (and ambition in particular) and his account of
political institutions like the presidency. These remain, in his analysis, two separate entities.
The notable exception to how political theorists have pursued the issue of political
ambition is Douglass Adair whose Fame and the Founding Fathers (1974) focuses on the desire
for honor, fame, and glory that developed in the late 1700s. Providing a detailed account of some
of the greatest American minds and how their perceptions of fame and honor differ, Adair’s
analysis begins with a focus on the American Revolution and creation of patriotism, selfsacrifice, and high performance in the defense of liberty. Adair quotes de Tocqueville in saying
“ambitious men in democracies are [little] engrossed with the interests and judgements of
posterity; the present moment alone engages and absorbs them. They are more apt to complete a
number of undertakings with rapidity, than to raise lasting monuments of their achievements; and
they care much more for success than for fame” (Adair 1974, 7-8). Adair profiles George
Washington’s ambition in seeking success as a military general rather than fame and recognition
of his name. Adair also profiles Benjamin Franklin as someone who desired to build a “lasting
monument” (Adair 1974, 9) rather than finding fame. He spent his later years as a philosopher,
teacher and public servant and devoted his time to the people rather than himself.

In all of these accounts of the “greatest of great generation,” Adair finds a common
element-- an obsessive drive for fame and recognition (Adair 1974, 9). That desire for fame
overtakes their minds and everything they do, and their only achievements are ones that grant
them a notoriety. In making this argument, Adair makes a clear distinction between fame, honor,
and glory. Adair defines honor as an inherent part of an individual’s identity and a characteristic
that is rooted in “regard to the censure of the world” (Adair 1974, 13). Adair claims that all too
often honor is linked to one’s social status or privilege, when in reality it is the exact opposite of
that. Fame, however, is defined by how large of an audience an individual can garner with their
actions and notoriety. Adair insists that fame must be earned and that the main reason individuals
desire fame is because it makes them immortal in the sense that they are remembered. Those
who desire fame long for a legacy. Adair quotes Hamilton saying “A man of virtue and ability,
dignified with so precious a trust, would rejoice that fortune had given him birth at a time and
placed him in circumstances so favorable for promoting human happiness. He would esteem it
not more the duty than the privilege and ornament of his office to do good to all mankind” (Adair
1974, 21). In terms of a representative or individual in politics, someone seeking fame should do
it for the good of the people and not for their own selfish reasons.
Despite the implications of Adair’s argument, the closest scholars come to following his
lead and providing a fuller treatment of political ambition in American political thought are those
interested in the nature of executive power. This is not surprising, though, given the centrality of
political ambition to Hamilton’s account of the executive in The Federalist. In “Federalist 72,”
Hamilton writes:
The position will not be disputed, so long as it is admitted that the desire for reward is
one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity

of mankind, is to make interest coincide with duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling
passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive
and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and
perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what
he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw
that he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that,
together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the
task.
Harvey C. Mansfield’s reading of this passage comes close to making a connection between
political ambition and the extent of executive power. In his formulation, there is distinction to be
drawn between “a knight answering a challenge” and “a merchant seeking gain” (Mansfield
1989, 263.) In contrast to the merchant who seeks the private gain of profit, the knight
ambitiously upholds the US Constitution and in doing so pursues the common good. Without
explicitly drawing this conclusion, Mansfield suggests that the form of political ambition that
informs the Founder’s understanding of executive power is honorable ambition (see also Epstein
1984, 111-125; Walling 1999; Flaumenhaft 1992).
Similarly, Clement Fatovic (2004) also attempts to connect ambition to the executive.
Focusing on presidential prerogative from the perspectives of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander
Hamilton, Fatovic concludes that the Constitution grants the president the use of prerogative. In
other words, the president has the “power to act according to discretion, for the public good,
without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it” (Locke 1980, 84). Fatovic’s
argument in favor of executive prerogative raises a series of interesting questions. As Fatovic
(2004, 422) might ask: what is the understanding of political ambition that first enables the

presidency to “deal with the ordinary and extraordinary problems of politics” and, second,
prevent the presidency “from becoming threats to the liberties and other values that they are
appointed to preserve?”
My project addresses these interrelated questions by making the connection between
political ambition to executive power in American political thought. In order to do this, it is first
necessary to establish a baseline understanding of political ambition. In other words, I need to
determine what understanding of political ambition animates American political thinking more
generally. To achieve this goal, I use Robert Faulkner’s (2008) The Case for Greatness to
identify various forms of political ambition available to the Founding Fathers. Unlike Adair who
focuses exclusively on Francis Bacon’s typology of ambition and greatness, Faulkner draws
more broadly from the history of political thought and identifies the following forms of ambition:
•

Imperial Ambition: Those who have imperial ambition, such as Thucydides’
Alcibiades, are not searching for everyday honor but rather are searching for
glory, superiority, and accomplishment.

•

Grand Ambition: Those who have grand ambition, such as Socrates’ account of
Alcibiades, have a passion for ever increasing fame and power and see pride as a
disadvantage.

•

Noble Ambition: Those who have noble ambition, such as Xenophon’s Cyrus,
desire true superiority.

•

Honorable Ambition: Those who have honorable ambition, such as Faulkner’s
analysis of George Washington, seek security as an end of their ambition. They
desire preservation and empowerment of the nation, from which they derive

honor. They tend to have a strong sense of duty and a deep obligation to their
country.
In this thesis, I test for the presence of these forms of political ambition in the argument offered
in support of ratifying the US Constitution. I do this in the following steps. First, I consider the
role political ambition plays in the theory of checks and balances more generally. To do this, I
select broadly from The Federalist with an eye to identifying the fundamental political problem
identified by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (Federalist 9 and Federalist 10) and the solution to this
problem as provided by the Madisonian model (Federalist 47-59). Having established the role of
political ambition within the proposed system of government at a macro level, the argument
made here, second, turns its attention to the executive power. Here, I conduct a close textual
analysis of the sections of The Federalist that focus on the executive (Federalist 67-77). Finally,
the thesis concludes by offering some thoughts on the implications of the argument made here
for the current state of American politics. In particular, I consider the importance of a healthy
form of political ambition given recent developments like unitary executive theory. I also
consider how political parties explain the movement away from the understanding of the political
ambition envisions by the Founders.
Throughout this study I will employ the method of textual analysis re-discovered by Leo
Strauss. In Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss (1988) articulates a method of inquiry
devoted to the objective of understanding past thinkers as they understood themselves. This
requires three things of the researcher. First, one must suspend one’s own questions to see the
questions of the author. Second, one is to rely, as much as possible, on what the author says
directly (exoteric) and indirectly (esoteric) and as little as possible on extraneous information.
Finally, the researcher should strive to use the terms and premises of the author and avoid using

foreign terms and premises. Thus, the method of textual analysis I will employ in this study
differs from other methods that view past thinkers as reflections of their historical time or their
thought as deriving from psychological or economic causes.
Ambition in the System of Checks and Balances
The argument in favor of ratifying the proposed constitution provided in The Federalist
centers around the defense of popular or republican government.1 The greatest threat faced by
popular government is faction. Writing in “Federalist 9,” Hamilton posits that a “firm union will
be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the states, as a barrier against domestic
faction and insurrection.” Madison begins “Federalist 10” in similar fashion, contending that
“Among the numerous advantages promises by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be
more accurately developed, than its tendency to break and control the violence of factions.” The
concern with factions is grounded in human history and American political experience. With
regard to the former, Hamilton identifies factions as the primary source of the “disorders that
distinguish the annals of those republics” which have subsequently been employed by “the
advocates of despotism” against “the forms of republican government” as well as “the very

In “Federalist 10,” Madison makes an important distinction between a pure democracy on the
one hand and a republic on the other. What differentiates the latter from the former is the
presence of representation requiring the people to elect those who conduct politics on their
behalf. In a pure democracy, the people gather to conduct the business of politics themselves.
Madison’s distinction has been the source of a misunderstanding of the nature of the American
political system. Taking Madison literally and deliberately misrepresenting the distinction he
makes; some contend that we never contended to place the American political system on a
broadly popular foundation. Those holding this position often argue in favor of severe
restrictions on the right to vote. The problem with this interpretation of Madison is that his
understanding of republican government focuses narrowly on the system of representation. In
order for this system to work, democratic elections must take place. Madison only argues against
pure democracy. Most arguments to extend the right to vote made throughout American history
or those arguments to make voting as easy as possible do not contend for pure democracy.
Rather, following Madison, these arguments seek only to place the system of representation on
its proper democratic foundation.
1

principles of civil religion” (Federalist 9). As for American political experience, Madison
identifies faction as the source of the “instability, injustice, and confusion” that characterizes
America’s public counsels (Federalist 10).
In taking up this challenge, the authors of The Federalist face a very specific challenge.
Advocates of ratification must remain a “friend of popular government” and not violate “the
principles to which he is attached” while at the same time providing a cure for the “mischiefs of
faction” (Federalist 10). In other words, it is necessary “To secure the public goods, and private
rights against the dangers of such [majority] faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit
and the form of the government …” (Federalist 10). It is thus necessary to secure the proper ends
of government without violating the central tenet of popular government—the principle of
majority rule (see Gibson 2020, 263-79). This is identified by Madison as “the great object to
which our inquiries are directed” (Federalist 10). To realize this object, Hamilton identifies
developments in the “science of politics” that “were either not known at all, or imperfectly
known to the ancients” as the key (Federalist 9). These developments include the following:
1. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments.
2. The introduction of legislative balances and checks.
3. An independent judiciary.
4. Legislative representation.
5. The extended republic.
The remainder of this section focuses on the argument made in The Federalist for how the
proposed constitution will control the effects of faction. In particular, it focuses on the role
political ambition plays in this model.
Federalist 10

In “Federalist 10,” Madison offers social solutions to the problem of majority tyranny,
stating “There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its
causes; the other, by controlling its effects” (Federalist 10.) Madison does not deny that factions
will form regardless simply due to human nature. As long as man has the ability to exercise
opinion, factions will form. Madison, however, uses that self-interest as a way to make
government safe, by making the first object of government the protection of “different and
unequal faculties” which include property and possessions (Federalist 10). By securing the
distribution of property, it is less likely for individuals to “fall into mutual animosities”
(Federalist 10.) Madison goes on to state “the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that
relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects” (Federalist 10.) He suggests that
a republic is the solution to this problem of faction, just as Hamilton does in “Federalist 9.”
Madison states that the republic will solve this issue in two ways – the delegation of government
and a greater number of citizens.
Madison’s first solution to controlling the violence of factions is to emphasize
representation. According to Madison, not only does the presence of a system of representation
differentiate a republic from a pure democracy, it facilitates government’s ability to regulate the
“various and interfering interests” of society and this is identified by Madison and “the principle
task of modern legislation” (Federalist 10). Necessarily involving “the spirit of party and
faction,” representation is characterized by its ability to “refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations” (Federalist 10). In Madison’s understanding of
representation, elected officials are responsible for “refining” or removing from public opinion

any impurities. Impurities, in this instance, can be understood as those aspects of public opinion
that are overly particular and, consequently, inconsistent with the public good. The ability of
representation and representatives to do this is a source for Madison’s optimism. While not
perfect, because “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm,” representation makes it
more likely that the public view articulated by elected officials “will be more consonant with the
public good” than if the American people deliberated in person (Federalist 10).2
Representation makes possible Madison’s second solution—the extended republic. By
placing political responsibility in the hands of elected officials, it becomes possible to
incorporate a “greater number of citizens, and extent of territory …” (Federalist 10). The latter,
according to Madison, is a circumstance “which renders factious combinations less to be
dreaded” (Federalist 10). The reason for this is laid out by Madison in the following: “Extend the
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such
a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength, and to act in unison with each other” (Federalist 10). Not only does the extensive size
of the American republic make it less likely for factions to coordinate their efforts, but by

Madison’s faith in representation is informed by his faith in the voter. He raises the question of
what would happen if people of “factious tempers, of local prejudice, or of sinister designs” were
to be elected (Federalist 10)? In response, he offers two arguments. First, he contends that by
increasing both the size of the nation and its population, the people will have a greater number of
fit characters to choose from. Importantly, Madison assumes that ration of fit to unfit (he never
specifies what this ratio is) characters found in a small republic remains constant as the size of
the republic increases. To the extent that this is true, the people are still required to select these
persons and Madison is optimistic in their ability to do this. He argues, “… it will be more
difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts, by which elections are
too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in
men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters”
(Federalist 10).
2

increasing both the size of the national and the number of citizens a situation is created where the
sheer number of factions make it less likely that a majority faction will form. If a majority
faction were to form, Madison points to the separation of powers and the system of checks as
balances as the means of controlling the effects of faction.
The Madisonian Model (Federalist #47-59)
Madison returns to the topic of majority tyranny in “Federalist 47.” There, he takes up the
Anti-Federalist objection that the proposed constitution does not keep the three political powers
separate and distinct. They contend that the principles of separation of powers are violated and,
subsequently, the proposed constitution opens the door to tyranny (see Storing 1985, 187, 208, &
217-18). Madison responds to this concern by first providing a common definition of tyranny.
He defines tyranny as the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective” (Federalist 47). The main objective of “Federalist 47” is to demonstrate that the AntiFederalist understanding of the separation of powers is faulty. In particular, Madison sets out to
show that their understanding is at odds with historical political experience broadly construed
and America’s own political experience. Madison uses his analysis of the British Constitution to
demonstrate the former and his analysis of the state constitutions to demonstrate the latter. Both
analyses show that the Anti-Federalist argument that the legislative, executive, and judicial
department ought to be completely distinct is a mistake. As Madison states in the subsequent
essay, “the degree of separation which the [Anti-Federalist] maxim requires, as essential to a free
government, can never in practice be duly maintained” (Federalist 48). Madison’s analysis shows
that the separation of powers is properly understood in terms of partial agency. It is ultimately on
partial agency that Madison will build his famous argument for the separation of powers in

“Federalist 51.” Before he takes up this argument, Madison must first deal with a larger
problem—attachment to the Constitution. While this may seem like a digression, the argument
that the Constitution is the proper object of attachment and concern helps one to understand the
argument made in “Federalist 51” and, in particular, helps to clarify what Madison says there
about the proper object of political ambition.
“Federalist 49-50” provide Madison’s response to Thomas Jefferson’s argument in favor
of frequent recourse to the American people. Madison quotes Jefferson’s Notes on the state of
Virginia as follows: “that whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in
opinion each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary
for altering the constitution, or correcting breaches of it, a convention shall be called for the
purpose” (Federalist 49). Madison agrees with Jefferson that the people “are the only legitimate
fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter … is derived; it seems
strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority …” (Federalist
49). He departs from Jefferson on how often there should be recurrence to the people. He writes,
“that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for
certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against
the proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several
departments of power within their constitutional limits” (Federalist 49). `
Following Hume, Madison worries that “every appeal to the people” carries with it “an
implication of some defect in the government” (Federalist 49).3 To the extent that this is true,

On Hume’s constitutionalism see Manzer (1996) and on the relationship between Hume and
The Federalist see Manzer (2001). Adair (1974) identifies the following essays by Hume as key
to linking his thought to that of Madison: 1) “Of the First Principles of Government,” 2) “Of the
Independency of Parliament,” 3) “Of Parties in General,” 4) “Of the Parties of Great Britain,”
3

frequent appeals to the people would be an indication of numerous defects in the Constitution
and, subsequently, this would result in the government created by the Constitution being
deprived “of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the
wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability” (Federalist 49). If, as
both Madison and Hume contend, all governments “rest on opinion,” then frequent recurrence to
the people will have the effect of undermining the requisite confidence the public needs to have
in its government (Federalist 49; see Hume 1987, 32-33). One of the best means of generating
the requisite confidence is to provide the people with political examples that are “ancient, as well
as numerous” because doing so shifts the prejudices of the people from having doubts and
reservations about the Constitution to supporting the Constitution (Federalist 49). Thus, while
Jefferson’s plan of frequent recurrence to the people will likely have the effect of “disturbing the
public tranquility, by interesting too strongly the public passions,” the amendment process laid
out in Article V of the Constitution allows the “reason of the public alone” to “sit in judgment”
and “control and regulate the government” (Federalist 49). For Madison, there is no need for
frequent conventions as a virtue associated with frequent elections is “their aptitude for enforcing
the constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds; without
particularly considering them, as provisions for altering the constitution itself” (Federalist 50).
What is important here for the argument Madison will make in “Federalist 51” and beyond is the
idea that the Constitution provides both voters and elected officials with criteria for holding
government accountable and maintaining the proper relationship between the branches of
government. Given the role played by the Constitution here, it is thus imperative that both the

and 5) “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.” To this list, Spencer (2002) contends that Hume’s
History of England should be seen as an important influence on Madison’s thinking about
faction.

public and elected officials venerate the Constitution in both word (think of the Oath of Office
taken by all elected officials) and deed. How this should play out in practice is the topic Madison
turns to in “Federalist 51.”
In “Federalist 51” Madison argues that the key to preventing tyranny is “contriving the
interior structure of the government, as what its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.” By shifting his focus to “the
interior structure of government,” Madison moves away from the separation of powers and
focuses on the system of checks and balances which was identified by Hamilton as one of the
developments in the “science of politics” that has “received great improvement” (Federalist 9).
Madison’s shift in focus actually began in “Federalist 48” where he initially discusses the
importance of blending the branches without there being an overabundance of reliance on each
other. There, Madison shows “that unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as
to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation … can never in
practice be duly maintained” (Federalist 48). For Madison, key to maintaining the separation of
powers provided by the Constitution lies not in “parchment barriers,” but in “contriving the
interior structure of government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper place” (Federalist 51).
From an institutional perspective, this is accomplished by first making sure that “each
department should have a will of its own” (Federalist 51). Given the nature of republican or
popular government, this can be interpreted to mean that each department is held accountable by
a different group or constituency. Madison suggests as much when he says that “each department
should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the

appointment of the members of the others” (Federalist 51).4 Second, it is “equally evident, that
the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others,
for the emoluments annexed to their offices” (Federalist 51). In language that harkens back to
The Declaration of Independence, Madison speaks of the danger when one branch of
government is able to make another branch dependent on its will. In The Declaration, Jefferson
speaks of the King making “judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries” (Declaration). In order to prevent efforts by one
branch to reduce another to a state of dependence, it is necessary, finally, to make sure that each
branch has the “constitutional means” to “resists encroachments of the others” (Federalist 51).
Madison’s institutional mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient means for maintaining the
proper balance between the three branches of government. To this, it is necessary to add the
proper motive, and this is where attachment to the Constitution and political ambition play key
roles.
Madison clearly identifies ambition as the personal motive that will prevent the types of
encroachments that lead to tyranny. He famously writes, “The provision for defence must in this,
as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of the attack. Ambition must be made
to counteract ambition. The interest of the man, must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place” (Federalist 51). Madison clearly states that the mutual relationships between the
three branches of government are driven by ambition. What is less clear is the object of ambition.
Here, he speaks of the connections between elected officials and “the constitutional rights of the

4

Madison does recognize that the judiciary violates this general principle as the executive is
responsible for nominating federal judges and the Senate has the power to confirm these
nominations. Despite this, the independence of the judiciary is seen as an adequate solution
preventing the Court from being dependent on either of the other two branches of government
(see Federalist 78-82).

place.” Interestingly, Madison does not speak of ambition for reelection. His concern with
“constitutional rights of the place” suggests that the proper object of ambition is the Constitution
or, to be more precise, a particular section of the Constitution. Clarifying the meaning of
Madison’s use of place helps to put this into sharper focus. One can think of the various
departments of government as being directly connected to particular parts of the Constitution.
Article I, for example, is most relevant to the House and the Senate as it is here that the
Constitution formally lays out the express powers granted Congress (Article I, Section 8), but
also those powers unique to the House and Senate (see Article I, Section 7 as well as Article II,
Section 2). Similarly, Article II is most relevant to the Presidency and Article III to the Court. 5
What Madison suggests here is that each department of government ambitiously seeks to protect
itself from the other departments. He does not expect, nor does he require elected officials to put
the common good ahead of private interest. But by defining private interest in terms other than
reelection, Madison expands the object of ambition just enough to believe that the “policy of
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives” is the key to securing
justice which is “the end of government” (Federalist 51).
The conclusion that Madison defines the proper object of political ambition in
constitutional terms can be tested by considering the argument he makes with regard to the
House in “Federalist 52-59.” In particular, Madison’s responses to two questions help to clarify
the understanding of political ambition provided in the reading of “Federalist 51” just offered.
The first question is who should govern and the second question concerns Madison’s
understanding of the proper relationship between the people and their elected officials.

5

With regard to the Court, a strong argument can be made that the entirety of the Constitution is
the rightful object of the Court’s ambition given the fact that they exercise the power of
“judgement” in interpreting the Constitution as a whole (see Federalist 78).

Madison’s answers to these questions have the added benefit of allowing one to compare his
view of political ambition to that provided by Hamilton which, in turn, allows the interpretation
of The Federalist provided here to speak to the possibility that Publius suffers from a split
personality.
To understand Madison’s perception of ambition it is important to understand who
Madison believes is properly suited to govern. Madison takes up that question by looking at the
intentions of those who govern. The most important intention of those who govern should be the
concern and knowledge of those they govern. On this, Madison writes that it “is a sound and
important principle, that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and
circumstances of his constituents” (Federalist 56; see also Hamilton in Federalist 36). This
should not be interpreted, however, to mean that representatives should simply follow the
dictates of public opinion. With regard to these limits, Madison argues that the influence of these
“interests and circumstances” extend no further than to “those circumstances and interests to
which the authority and care of the representative relate” (Federalist 56). In other words,
constitutional limits (think of the express powers provided in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution as well as the limitation places on the legislative power in Article I, Section 9) have
the effect of limiting the negative ambition of legislators.
Another important aspect of those who govern is their experience. Madison feels that
there must be a sufficient level of experience among representatives. This is evident in his
understanding of a competent legislator. According to Madison, in addition to an “upright
intention and sound judgment,” this person must also possess a “certain degree of knowledge of
the subjects on which he is to legislate” (Federalist 53). While a portion of this knowledge may

be acquired through means of information available to all private persons, the rest can only be
acquired “by actual experience in the state which requires use of it” (Federalist 53).
Madison’s analysis of the competency of representatives as well as his understanding of
human nature speaks to the bigger picture of ambition. It is accurate to say that Hamilton is open
to the notion that elected officials will be motivated by electoral self-interest. This is evident in
“Federalist 35” where Hamilton recognizes that it is natural for “a man who is a candidate for the
favour of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellows citizens for the
continuance of his public honours, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and
inclinations.” Unlike those who contend that electoral self-interest is the driving factor that
explains the relationship between the people and their elected officials, Hamilton concludes that
rather than following the wishes of their constituencies, members of Congress should “allow
them [dispositions and inclinations] their proper degree of influence on his conduct” (Federalist
35). Thus, Hamilton’s understanding of this relationship is open to influences other than electoral
self-interest. This fact indicates that what Hamilton provides on representation in “Federalist 3536” actually compliments the understanding of Madison provided later in the text.
Writing in “Federalist 57,” Madison agrees with Hamilton that representatives should
have a connection to their constituents. He describes this affection as “temporary” and emanating
for the fact that they hold public office (Federalist 57). Where Hamilton gives special attention to
electoral self-interest in “Federalist 35,” here Madison will clarify the other motives alluded to
by Hamilton. Madison indicates that other “marks” will characterize the relationship between
representatives and the people, and these include honor, favor, esteem, and confidence
(Federalist 57). Ultimately, the ties between the people and their representatives “are
strengthened by motives more selfish in nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of

government which favors his pretensions, and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions”
(Federalist 57). The interpretation of the motivations of representatives offered here closely
resembles that suggested by Adair (1974). He contends that all politicians are motivated by selfinterest, but that what really matters is the object of this self-interest. As indicated here, the
proper object of political ambition is the Constitution and the principles this represents. Given
the special place of the Constitution in American politics, Mansfield (1989) is correct in
emphasizing the importance of upholding the Constitution. His interpretation does not go far
enough, however. Madison, in particular, demonstrates that representatives should concern
themselves with more than reelection. They must also be motivated by duty and gratitude. This is
why, at the end of “Federalist 55,” Madison offers the following summary of the moral
requirements of elected officials. He writes:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of
circumspection and distrust; so there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the
existence of these qualities in higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which
have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the
human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for
self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them
from destroying and devouring one another (Federalist 55).
The virtue Madison speaks of here is reminiscent of the honorable form of ambition associated
with George Washington. This honorable ambition is one that is driven by a sense of duty and a
“deep conviction of his obligations to his country” as articulated in the Constitution (Faulkner

2008, 181). It is a drive to preserve and empower oneself, where security is the object of
ambition rather than honor or fame.
The honorable ambition that upholds the Constitution and its principles can be contrasted
with the negative ambition associated with factions. In “Federalist 10,” Madison defends the
Constitution by stating it establishes a government capable of mediating violence and damage
created by factions. These factions are groups of people who form to protect their own special
interests and opinions, whether it be economic or political. These groups work against the public
interest and infringe on the rights of others for their own personal gain. In these factions we see a
sort of grand ambition as described by Robert Faulkner in The Case for Greatness. Here,
Faulkner uses Socrates’ Alcibiades to detail a form of grand ambition where there is a passion
for ever increasing fame and power and where pride is a disadvantage to Alcibiades. However,
Madison’s form of government as established in the Constitution is structured to counteract that
ambition. Madison understands that these factions are inevitable due to human nature but with
the structure of Congress, the object of that ambition can be used for the good of the government.
With representation put in place, the public can elect their officials based on both the public and
private interest of the representatives. The latter is rendered safe as the object of one’s ambition
is the same as the public interest.
Madison is justified in drawing this conclusion because of his understanding of how the
republican system of government proposed by the Constitution maintains itself. Madison
identifies two key solutions. First, he conceptualizes elections as contests of merit (Federalist
57). This speaks to the importance Madison places on the requirements of office. For there to be
no professional, economic or religious requirement for office, it is truly based on the virtue and
merit of the individual seeking election. The emphasis Madison places on the idea or merit

naturally raises the question of how does he understand this term? He provides an answer in his
understanding of the purpose of every constitution. According to him, “The aim of every
political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public
trust” (Federalist 57). At the heart of Madison’s constitutionalism rests a noble understanding of
politics. This is suggested by his emphasis on “wisdom to discern” and “virtue to pursue” the
common good and not the private good. Additionally, it is imperative to keep elected officials
“virtuous.” Were the Constitution to fail at this, a majority could sacrifice both the “rights of
other citizens” as well as the “permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Federalist
10).
The second solution that Madison offers in order to maintain this system of government
is the best way to combat corruption. For Madison, ambition serves as a check on corruption (see
Federalist 55). For Madison, an individual’s desire to hold office will outweigh any sort of
influence that would lead to them forfeiting their title. Madison uses the example of the Congress
in place at the time of the Revolution. Even with the offer of foreign gold, they held strong and
did not allow the temptation to cost them their title. Their ambition for office was sufficient to
counteract the corruption that could have crept in. The object of a representative’s ambition must
be their position and the office itself, as well as their constituents in order for them to avoid
corruption.
Ambition in the Executive
The nature of the political ambition that characterizes the executive branch has long been
a topic of interest for historians and political theorists. Emphasizing Hamilton’s concerns with

self-sacrifice and patriotism, writers such as J.G.A. Pocock and Gordon S. Wood argue that civic
republicanism offers the best understanding of what motivates the presidency according to
Hamilton. According to these authors, civic republicanism involves more of a “willingness of the
individual to sacrifice his private interests for the good of the community” (Wood 1969, 68; see
also Pocock 1975, 184). This is the type of civic republicanism that is seen in “Federalist 70” and
“Federalist 71.” According to this reading, one finds in Hamilton an executive that can be
understood in Aristotelian terms. This is an executive concerned with corruption and virtue and
doing what is best for the good of the nation as a whole. Lance Banning (1992), however, rejects
this understanding of civic republicanism. He contends that the divide between civic
republicanism and liberalism that informs the arguments of Wood and Pocock is incorrect.
Banning argues that civic republicanism shares with liberalism a common understanding of
virtue (see also Gibson 2010). Closer inspection of Banning’s argument suggests a similarity to
Harvey C. Mansfield’s account of the executive.
Mansfield believes in a much more Machiavellian executive. Mansfield feels that the
executive is implicitly republican, or popular, and that winning over the people serves as the key
to their success. Mansfield references Publius’ idea of a “feeble executive” (Mansfield 1989,
250). This implies that the executive should not be stronger than the people who elected him.
This also brings into question whether or not the executive power has extended beyond its
original limits. Here, Richard Neustadt (2001) argues that the presidential office has been
weakened by various factors over time. He suggests that Congress is one of the biggest catalysts
for the breakdown of presidential power. Neustadt credits this weakening to the idea that formal
powers of the President have been trimmed by congressional behavior. Neustadt feels that the
separation of power between Congress and the president has become aggressive in areas such as

foreign policy and emergency situations. Consequently, considerable authority has been taken
away from the president. Neustadt states “Contemporary presidents have no authority to alter
organizational arrangements in the so-called ‘executive branch’. Nor do they any longer have the
freedom to ‘impound’ – thus saving – funds appropriated by Congress to departments” (Neustadt
2001, 2). As additional support for his argument, Neustadt also introduces evidence showing that
public opinion demeans the presidency and its effectiveness, and growing cynicism of the
presidency is limiting the office’s power and authority. However, looking at presidential and
congressional approval ratings over time, Neustadt’s position can be challenged. Gallup polls
show that while presidential approval ratings have been rising and falling over time, so have
congressional approval ratings. While Ronald Reagan had an overall approval rating of 52.8
percent, George H.W. Bush saw an approval rating of 60.9 percent. While this was a large
increase in the overall approval of a president, Barack Obama saw an approval rating of 47.9
percent. These numbers are fluid and rise and fall over the years. Congressional approval ratings
also rise and fall among the public over time. Since the beginning of 2021, over 71 percent of
Americans disapprove of the way Congress is handling their job (Gallup 2021). The vast
majority of Americans greatly disapprove of Congress which indicates that Neustadt’s
suggestion that Congress challenges presidential authority may not be correct.
An alternative interpretation of the current state of executive power is provided by
William G. Howell’s “Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action.”
Howell set out to show that rather than losing power, the presidency has actually increased its
power over time. Howell illustrates this point through the example of executive orders. Howell
states “Between 1920 and 1998, presidents issued 10,203 executive orders, or so roughly 130
annually. As might be expected, presidents issued thirty-three such orders, most of which dealt

with the management of governmental personnel” (Howell 2003, 250). Presidents utilize their
power through executive orders as a way to circumvent Congress, eliminating congressional
oversight. This period of time that Howell examines is a period in which presidential approval
fluctuated the most, rising and falling some twenty points at times. Howell, as his title suggests,
offers that persuasion is a large part of the president’s ability to hold power. Howell states
“Power was contingent upon persuasion, and persuasion of all the personal qualities individual
presidents bore; and so, the argument ran, what the presidency was at any moment critically
depended upon who filled the office” (Howell 2003, 252). Howell suggests that ambition and
character are a large part of the office and its functions. All of this leads to the issue of a unitary
executive. According to unitary executive theorists, Article II of the Constitution puts the
president in charge of executing the law and that therefore no other branch may limit presidential
discretion over executive matters.
Federalist 68-76
“Federalist 68” discusses the need of the Electoral College as a means of tumult,
disorder, cabal, intrigue, and corruption. We can see this parallel in “Federalist 10,” where
factions are warned against because of their ability to give way to demagoguery. When read in
conjunction with “Federalist 10,” “Federalist 68” reminds the reader of Publius’ concern with the
motives of our elected officials. In particular, it helps us to better understand the need for
“auxiliary precautions” in response to the possibility of bad motives like personal gain
(Federalist 51). As originally conceptualized, the Electoral College was viewed as a mechanism
that would prevent persons of poor ambition from being elected to nation’s highest office.
Hamilton argues that while the sense of the American people “should operate in the choice of the
person to whom so important a trust” has been conferred, this is only one of a number of factors

that should inform the decision of who the President is (Federalist 68). As a temporary body that
serves the single constitutional purpose of selecting the President, the Electoral College must
also concern itself with those “qualities adapted to the station” of the presidency (Federalist 68).
Above all else, the Electoral College should avoid selecting persons inclined to “low intrigue and
little arts of popularity” (Federalist 68). Such persons will not ambitiously protect the institution
of the presidency and preserve the constitutional equilibrium necessary for avoiding tyranny.
Hamilton continues to develop his understandings of political ambition and the
presidency in “Federalist 69” where he takes up the question what makes the president worthy of
indefinite reelection? In the last paragraph of this paper, Hamilton points to the concern of the
president with legacy. Presidents, according to Hamilton, will be concerned with how they are
viewed by history and the entire structure of “Federalist 69” suggests that the exercise of
executive power can be guided by this concern. Consisting of eleven paragraphs, the first ten
paragraphs of “Federalist 69” provide an account of the president’s express powers. It is in the
final paragraph where Hamilton lays out his understanding of the proper motivations for the
exercise of these powers or, to put in another way, the necessary motives to ensure that these
powers are not abused and used for the public good. Unlike the king of Great Britain, the
president is eligible for reelection every four years and Hamilton conceptualized elections in
terms of an opportunity for the American people to punish a bad president with removal from
office or reward a good president with another four years in office (Federalist 69). While this is a
fairly straightforward view of elections, what matters for Hamilton’s argument is how a president
who seeks and fails to gain reelection will be viewed by the public and himself. Here, Hamilton
speaks of “disgrace” (Federalist 69). Not wanting to be seen as a disgrace by others or himself,
the president is to pursue policies and exercise executive power in a way that garners the esteem

of the American people. Relying on the president to be cognizant of the trust the public puts into
them and their position is, by itself, an inadequate solution to the potential dangers associated
with political ambition. What is necessary is a sense of shame. Shame, however, should not be
understood as the feeling one has when they do something they know to be morally
objectionable. Rather, shame should be understood in constitutional terms. As Faulkner’s
analysis of Washington suggests, honorable ambition focuses on the ability of the president to
provide security to the nation. Like Washington, Hamilton understands that the executive’s
primary ambition is to preserve and empower the nation. The motivation behind this is not
concern for the common good. The motivation resides in the desire for honor. The president
should demonstrate a strong sense of duty and a deep obligation to the welfare of the nation.
What is important to understand here is that the duty of the president and the nature of his
obligation are prescribed by the Constitution. Thus, the ambition pointed to here is actually a
combination of Faulkner’s honorable ambition and Mansfield’s emphasis on the Constitution. To
simplify, what is honorable is constitutional and vice versa.
In “Federalist 70,” Hamilton explores the consequences of negative ambition, which we
can also see parallels in “Federalist 47.” The main concern of these negative consequences is the
aspiration to tyranny. The two elements of the aspiration to tyranny focused on are sedition and
bad ambition becoming self-serving. While there is general agreement among the friends of
republican government that this should happen, there is disagreement over how best to
accomplish this goal. Anti-Federalists contend that an energetic executive is inconsistent with the
genius of republican government (see Storing 1985, 308-15, 320, & 327). In response, Hamilton
contends that the advocates of republican government “must at least hope, that the supposition is
destitute of foundation” (Federalist 70). In order to reap the administrative benefits of an

executive characterized by decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch, it is necessary to maintain
due dependence on the people as well as due responsibility (Federalist 70).
Key to making the executive safe is avoiding a plural executive. On arguing against a
plural executive, Hamilton offers insight into the nature of executive responsibility and the
proper motivations of the nation’s chief executive. A plural executive, according to Hamilton,
creates a situation where differences of opinion may undermine the common enterprises of the
nation. This would result in a loss of respectability for both the office of the president and the
national government itsef (Federalist 70). With the authority of the national government
weakened, a plural executive will “impede and frustrate the most important measure of the
government, in the most critical emergencies of the state” (Federalist 70). Hamilton does not
regard “critical emergencies” as simply responses to catastrophic events. As he indicates in
“Federalist 72,” presidents “plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public
benefit.” Spurred by the love of fame, Hamilton argues that presidents will pursue policies that
require “considerable time to mature and perfect them” in the name of advancing the common
good (Federalist 72).
As bad as undermining the ability of government to pursue and execute good public
policy, a plural executive is much more likely to exacerbate the problem of factions. According
to Hamilton, “what is still worse, thy [plural executives] might split the community into violent
and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the
magistracy” (Federalist 70). Hamilton’s worry about the consequences associated with the
violence of factions, particularly the dissolution of the union itself, speaks to honorable
ambition’s emphasis on security. That a plural executive would also undermine the proper
objects of government also speaks to honorable ambition. On these objects, Madison says that

they be may divided into two general classes. In the first, are those “depending on measures,
which have singly an immediate and sensible operation” (Federalist 63). These are not the
policies Hamilton is concerned with and sees the President having an important role in
developing and executing. Rather, he is concerned with the second class: those “depending on a
succession of well chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps
unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent
welfare of every country, needs no explanation” (Federalist 63).
With regard to how one ensures that the executive will pursue these objects, Hamilton
relies on human nature. The executive, like all humans, seeks positive things and tries to avoid
negative things. As an elected official, the executive can be held to two forms of responsibility—
censure and punishment (Federalist 70).6 The first of these is the most important negative
consequence for elected officials as it is more likely that they will act in ways that violate the
public trust than in ways that violate the law (Federalist 70). In order to reap the benefits of the
desire to avoid public censure, it is necessary to place the president in a position from which they
can take steps to avoid this. This means that not only is a single executive preferable, but that the
executive’s term of office should be sufficient, and they should be eligible for reelection.
According to Hamilton, it is a general principle of human nature that people are interested in
whatever they possess “in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he
holds it …” (Federalist 71). If the tenure is not very secure due to “a momentary or uncertain
title,” one is less attached (Federalist 71). Given this understanding, in order to attach the
president to the office of the presidency a term of at least four years is deemed sufficient. The
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Hamilton does not use censure here in terms of a Congressional censure of the President. When
he uses censure, he is referring to public censure and an elected official’s failure to get reelected.

four-year term also has the advantage of insulating the president from the convulsions of public
opinion. While the executive should be governed by “the deliberate sense of the community,” it
does not require “an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every
transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices
to betray their interests” (Federalist 71). Thus, it is the duty of the presidency to act as the
guardian of public interest which is consistent with the idea of honorable ambition.
“Federalist 72” continues to develop the argument for honorable ambition. Here,
Hamilton focuses on the second aspect of duration in office, eligibility for reelection. Eligibility
for reelection should have the effect of giving the person in office “the inclination and resolution
to act his part well” (Federalist 72). Were the president to be limited to a single term, the primary
inducement “to good behavior” would be removed (Federalist 72). As to why this would be the
case, Hamilton argues that people are motivated by reward and that this desire is “one of the
strongest incentives of human conduct” (Federalist 72). The reward Hamilton has in mind here is
the honor of reelection as well as the honor associated with the successful pursuit of those longterm policies that benefit the nation discussed earlier. If term limited, Hamilton believes that it is
unlikely that such policies would be pursued as the incentive to pursue such objects is effectively
removed from consideration. Consequently, term limits mean that the best that can be hoped for
is “the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good” (Federalist
72).
“Federalist 73” and “Federalist 74” continue Hamilton’s analysis of the presidential
motivation. In the absence of a properly structured presidency, Hamilton worries that the person
holding this office will treat it as a source of financial gain (Federalist 73; see also Federalist 75).
In response to this, Hamilton asks his reader to consider the question of how best to ensure that

this does not happen. Following Madison’s lead in “Federalist 10,” Hamilton does not look to
wisdom and virtue as potential solutions (Federalist 73). Rather, the solution lies in getting the
president to understand the role of his office in the system of checks and balances. Hamilton
argues that it is necessary that the president understand that the “legislative will not be infallible;
that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of
the members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations
…” (Federalist 73). Recognizing this and informed by a concern with his good reputation, the
president must first be enabled to “defend himself” (Federalist 73, see also Federalist 51). Of
secondary importance is concern with increasing “the chances in favour of the community
against the passing of bad laws …” (Federalist 73).7 Note the ordering employed by Hamilton.
Presidents are primarily motivated by political self-preservation. If Congress were to take
possession of a considerable amount of the executive power, the system of government that
enables one to seek political glory would be destroyed and one’s political ambitions cast to the
side. Relying on this motivation allows, secondly, the president to protect the community against
bad laws. While avoiding bad laws is more in line with the public good, it is important that this is
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Hamilton is well aware that the power to prevent bad laws also entails the power to prevent
good laws. This is possibility he is willing to accept. He writes, “… that the power of preventing
bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to
the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the
mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the
character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution to restrain the
excess of lawmaking, and to keep things in the same state in which they may happen to be at any
given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favourable to greater
stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few
good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones”
(Federalist 73). For Hamilton, a bad law that is predictable is preferable to the political condition
of the states where the inconstancy and mutability of the law undermines the requirement of
predictability. Without predictability, neither citizens or elected official can fulfill their
responsibilities.

of secondary importance for Hamilton. He does not expect that this would be a primary human
motivation. Given our selfish nature, it is far better to rely on this and attach it to something that
simultaneously facilitates the public good. As indicated previously, this can be accomplished by
relying on one’s concern to avoid a bad reputation.
“Federalist 74” discusses in more detail the motivations of the president. This time,
Hamilton’s situates his discussion within the context of the discretionary powers of the President.
If any problems with Hamilton’s reliance on a concern for glory and reputation were to present
themselves, it would be here as it is more difficult to object to discretionary powers based on the
text of the Constitution as discretionary powers allow the President to do what they feel is
necessary in situations such as emergency. Today, we tend to view the ability of the president to
exercise discretionary powers in a vacuum. This is to say, that the logic of unitary executive
action removes Congress from the conversation. This is not the case according to The Federalist.
When Hamilton conceptualized the administration of government in “Federalist 72,” the
“executive details” that constitute the administration of government are all shared powers. These
details include the following: 1) the conduct of foreign negotiations, 2) preparatory plans of
finance, 3) the application and disbursement of public monies in conformity with congressional
appropriations, 4) the arrangement of the army and navy, and 5) the directions of the operations
of war (Federalist 72). Closer inspection of these demonstrates that while the president may play
the primary role in the exercise of these powers, they are all shared or limited powers. The ability
to conduct foreign negotiations is limited by the requirement that the Senate must approve any
treaty before it goes into effect. The ability to engage in the preparatory plans of finance is
limited by the constitutional requirement that all revenue bills must originate in the House which
also limits the ability of the president to allocate money. As for the final two, the arrangement of

the military forces is limited by congressional allocation and before a president can direct the
operations of war, Congress must declare war.
The various elements of honorable ambition and its connection to the Constitution all
come together in “Federalist 76.” There, Hamilton takes up the power of appointment and at the
center of this account lies a president’s concern with his reputation. Central to a favorable or
good reputation is the ability of the president to fulfill his constitutional obligations. Making
appointments is one of these obligations and here one should be concerned with making
appointments that will advance the public good. According to Hamilton, the fact that the Senate
has confirmation power should cause the president to look beyond “his private inclinations and
interests” (Federalist 76). This should happen because of the fear of having one’s nominees
rejected by the Senate. Concerned that this may negatively affect his reputation and, ultimately,
his “political existence,” Hamilton believes that a president would “be both ashamed and afraid
to bring forward … candidates … personally allied to him [the president], or of possessing the
necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them obsequious instruments of his pleasure”
(Federalist 76). With the proper institutions in place, it thus becomes possible to take advantage
of those principles of human nature that produce “independent and public spirited men”
(Federalist 76). These principles include the love of honor and fame where the good is defined
not in abstract philosophical principles, but in constitutional terms.
Based on the analysis and argument presented in this section, it is thus possible to
conclude that Hamilton’s account of political ambition in the executive can be viewed as a
combination of Mansfield’s idea of constitutional ambition and Faulkner’s honorable ambition.
Mansfield (1989, 263) echoes the thoughts of Hamilton on the executive and Madison in
“Federalist 51” in arguing that “The constitutional office is connected to the interest of man, not

determined by it.” Unlike the incentives associated with economic institutions that reward and
encourage the narrowest form of self-interest, the institution of the presidency connects the
interest or ambition of the person in office to the duties of his office. The office, according to
Mansfield, “forms and appeals to his desire to excel” (Mansfield 1989, 263). Key to achieving
this success is honorable ambition. Motivated by strong sense of duty and obligation to the good
of the nation, the office of the president cannot properly fulfill its constitutional role when held
by a person of something other than honorable ambition. While the Constitution equips
government with the means of dealing with this situation (separation of powers, checks and
balances, judicial review, etc.), the fact that there has been an expansion of executive power
makes the topic of political ambition all the more important. To the extent that the presidency we
have today is more powerful than the one envisioned by Hamilton, it seems more important
today than when Washington was elected president in 1789 that the office is held by a person
who is characterized by the political ambition envisioned by the Founders.
Discussion and Conclusion
The argument and analysis of The Federalist presented here demonstrates that the nature
of political ambition can be derived from multiple places. With regard to the object of one’s
ambition, whether it be the desire for reelection or fame, ambition looks different in every aspect
of politics. With the system of checks and balances in place as established by James Madison,
the Constitution is able to mitigate ambition in a way that not only makes it safe by preventing
and combatting majority tyranny, but also connects political ambition to the pursuit of the
common good. As to how this happens, Madison’s analysis of representation and his argument
for the proper size of the House point to the interaction of honorable and constitutional ambition.
A similar understanding of ambition is also found in Hamilton’s presentation of executive power.

Here, the President’s concern for honor leads him to ambitiously perform his constitutional
responsibilities. Should he stray from his constitutional responsibilities, Congress is able to
check his misguided ambition because they ambitiously protect “the constitutional right of the
place” (Federalist 51). As shown here, Madison’s contention that “ambition must be made to
counteract ambition” presupposes a particular understanding of political ambition that is
fundamentally different from the default that characterizes contemporary political science—the
desire for reelection. While Hamilton is open to this consideration more than Madison, both
argue that in order for the Constitution to work, it is necessary “to obtain for rulers men who
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society …”
(Federalist 57). Without elected officials of this character, the government created by the
Constitution cannot fill its larger purpose. Rather than being an instrument to further the interests
of the nation, a government of officials characterized by lower political ambition degenerates
into the lowest form of politics where the interests of party trump concern for the common good.
The convergence of honorable and constitutional political ambition is particularly
important for us today. As shown above, Hamilton’s account of political ambition in “Federalist
76” connects to Faulkner and Mansfield’s accounts of ambition as well. What makes Faulkner’s
understanding of honorable ambition honorable is not strict adherence to a set of moral
principles. Rather, it is strict adherence to performing the constitutional responsibilities of the
office one holds. This has significant implications for how one should think about the executive
in light of arguments in favor of unitary executive theory. Unitary executive theory maintains
that the Constitution places the president alone in charge of executing the laws of the land.
Therefore, no other branch of government may limit presidential discretion over executive
matters. Assuming, for the moment, that this is an accurate reading of the Constitution, the

tremendous amount of discretion unitary executive theory grants the president makes the
character of the national executive all the more important. Were the office to be held by a person
characterized by “low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity,” the nation would find itself in
position from which the poor administration of government may undermine public faith in both
the government itself, but the Constitution more generally. As Madison contends in “Federalist
48-49,” lack of constitutional support inevitably leads to the breakdown of society.
Fortunately, close inspection of both the US Constitution and the argument made in The
Federalist raises doubts as to the accuracy of unitary executive theory’s constitutionality. To
interpret the Take Care Clause (Article II, Section 3) as rejecting both legislative and judicial
oversight of the executive is inconsistent with the argument of The Federalist and the
understanding of political ambition that drives the constitutional structure. Hamilton does argue
that the executive plays the key role in the administration of the law. This role, however, does
not occur in a constitutional vacuum. Hamilton’s discussion of executive power firmly places the
executive within the context of a system of checks and balances (see Federalist 75-77).
All of this being said, critics of the analysis and argument developed here can
legitimately argue that the understanding of political ambition provided in The Federalist borders
on being utopian speculation. How could the authors of The Federalist omit from their argument
an extended treatment of political parties? The debate between the Federalists and AntiFederalists was, after all, a debate between two de facto political parties. It is possible to defend
Madison and Hamilton and to point to a transformation of political parties in America that no
system of government can adequately check. In his “Of Parties in General,” David Hume
differentiates personal from real factions (parties) and says that real factions can be based on
interest, principle, and affection (Hume 1987, 56). Of the three types of real parties, Hume is

least worried about parties of interest. This is because the parties motivated by interest are not
typically destructive. Hume argues that parties of interest are easier to appease. One would
simply need to satisfy or promise to satisfy their interests. In contrast, it is impossible to satisfy
parties of principle. This is due to the fact that in order to satisfy parties of interest, it is
necessary for there to be wholesale revolution of the established order (see Hume 1987, 60-62;
Church 2007, 175; Livingston 1984, Ch. 12). The problem with these factions is that while they
battle against one another, they often lose sight of and threaten to undermine the main purpose of
our political society: industry, stability, and security. Where interest is predictable, principle is
not. Thus, to the extent that political parties today closely resemble factions of principle, Hume
would argue that American politic requires less principle and more interest. As long as at least
one of our parties is governed by [religious] principle, it will be “engendered by a spirit of
persecution” and this spirit, according to Hume, “has ever since been the poison of human
society, and the source of the most inveterate factions in every government” (Hume 1987, 62).
To move us away from a politics of victimhood, it is necessary to place in office persons who put
the good of the Constitution first. We also need a public that understands the constitutional
responsibilities of the various political offices and uses this understanding to make elections tests
of constitutional merit. This may be too much to ask for, but one need look no further than a
civic education that places the Constitution at its center as the starting point of making the
American system of government function in the way envisioned by the authors of The
Federalist.

Bibliography

Adair, Douglas. 1974. Fame and the Founding Fathers. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Banning, Lance. 1992. “The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and Prospect.” In The
Republican Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of Athon Billias, ed. Milton M. Klein, Richard
D. Brown, and John B. Hinch. Worcester: American Antiquarian Society.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2010. Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Church, Jeffrey. 2007. “Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the
Modern State.” Journal of Politics 69(February): 169-181.
Declaration of Inependence.
Epstein, David F. 1984. The Political Theory of The Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Fatovic, Clement. 2004. “Constitutionalism and Presidential Prerogative: Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian Perspectives.” American Journal of Political Science 48(July): 429-444.
Faulkner, Robert. 2008. The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and its Critics. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Fenno, Richard F. 2002. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. New York: Pearson,
Longman Classics.
Flaumenhaft, Harvey. 1992. The Effective Republic: Administration and Constitution in the
Thought of Alexander Hamilton. Durham: Duke University Press.
Gallup Polls. https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-galluphistorical-statistics-trends.aspx
Gallup Polls. https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx
Gibson, Alan. 2020. “Madison’s Republican Remedy: The Tenth Federalist and the Creation of
an Impartial Republic.” In The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist, ed. Jack N. Rakove and
Colleen A. Sheehan. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gibson, Alan. 2010. Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the Origins
and Foundations of the American Republic, 2nd edition. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James. 2001. The Federalist. Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund.
Howell, William G. 2015. Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hume, David. 1987. Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Livingston, Donald. 1984. Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Locke, John. 1980. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Mansfield, Harvey C. 1989. Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power.
New York: The Free Press.
Manzer, Robert A. 2001. “A Science of Politics: Hume, The Federalist, and the Politics of
Constitutional Attachment.” American Journal of Political Science. 45(July): 508-18.
Manzer, Robert A. 1996. “Hume’s Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional
Government.” American Political Science Review 90(September): 488-96.
Mayhew, David R. 2004. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Neustadt, Richard E. 2001. “The Weakening White House.” British Journal of Political Science
31(January): 1-11.
Pocock, J.G.A. 1975. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rosano, Michael J. 2003. “Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton’s
Conception of Human Nature.” American Journal of Political Science 47(January): 61-74.
Spencer, Mark G. 2002. “Hume and Madison on Faction.” The William and Mary Quarterly
59(October): 869-896.
Strauss, Leo. 1988. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Storing, Herbert J. 1985. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
US Constitution
Walling, Karl-Friedrich. 1999. Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free
Government. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Wood, Gordon S. 1969. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York: W.W.
Norton.

